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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
made for the immediate application of the gift for the benefit of the minor
the exclusion would be allowed.
On the basis of these cases it seems that the taxpayer can make a
present gift of the corpus or income of a trust to a minor2 by subjecting
the trustee to the same restrictions as would be imposed upon the guar-
dian of the minor's estate by operation of law.2& However, until the
matter is finally settled by the United States Supreme Court, the Com-
missioner might continue to assert that such gifts to persons under
disability are prima facie taxable and subject the taxpayer to a deficiency
assessment.29 Whether or not it would be advisable to employ the trust
in making gifts to minors under such circumstances seems -debatable.3 0
Nevertheless, if the settlor can in effect appoint the trustee as guardian
of the estateSl it is plausible that the benefits to be derived from the
trusteeship would justify the risk of a possible deficiency assessment.3 2
THOMAS M. MoORE.
Workmen's Compensation-Constitutional Law-Heart
Disease as an Occupational Disease
In 1949 the North Carolina General Assembly adopted an amend-
ment to the Workmen's Compensation Act which provided that certain
heart diseases would be deemed occupational diseases for firemen.' The
gift to a babe in arms because his estate must be managed by some one sui juris,
exercising the powers of a guardian or parent, while a gift to an adult, requiring
no managing third party, is tax free. Congress likes adult voters, but surely not
that well" 141 F. 2d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1944).
27 However, if the donor of the trust is legally obligated to support the bene-
ficiary, then to the extent that the income of the trust is applied to the support or
maintenance of the beneficiary, it will be treated as the income of the donor under
INT. REv. CoDE §167 (c). In Wallace Townsend, Exr. v. Thompson, CCH FEDERAL
ESTATE AND Gnr TAX REPoRTEm 10,780 (D. C. Ark. 1950), where the donor-
trustee, who was the father of the child beneficiary, died before the minor attained
majority, the court held that the corpus of the trust was to be included in the
donor's estate.
8 Fleming, Gifts for the Benefits of Minors, 49 MicE. L. REv. 529, 539 (1951).
"The administration of the tax laws should be practical, so the argument runs, and
a practical administration of the present interest test should regard the rights,
controls, and enjoyment of the guardian as that of the minor."2" Anderson, Gifts to Children and Incompetents, 26 TAXES 911, 916 (1948).
" Drexler, The Exclusion Provision of the Gift Tax Law Needs Amending, 29
TAXES 743, 747 (1951), ". . . in many instances where the trust device continues
to be employed, such as in the Strekalovsky and Kieckhefer cases, it has caused
the basic provisions of the trust to be so fundamentally altered that it hardly con-
stitutes a trust at all, as the term is traditionally understood."
"
1 Cannon v. Roberson, 98 F. Supp. 331 (W. D. N. C. 1951).
"
2 As a practical matter, it seems that the donor could make a gift directly to
the minor and then attempt to have someone who is in accord with his views ap-
pointed as guardian.
1 IN. C. GEN. STAT. §97-53(26) (1950) : "In case of members of fire departments
of cities, counties or municipal corporations or political subdivisions of the state,
whether such members are voluntary, partly paid or fully paid; coronary throm-
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first case arising under this statute was just recently decided. A fireman
died as the result of coronary occlusion while upon his vacation and the
commission made an award to his widow based upon the statute. The
North Carolina Supreme Court held that the statute was in violation of
the constitutional provision barring special emoluments2 and reversed
the decision of the lower court which had affirmed the commission's
award.
The court repeated a statement made in a prior case that "heart
'disease is not an occupational disease."4  In that case a game warden
died from coronary occlusion shortly after having trouble arresting some
game law violators, and denial of compensation by the commission
was sustained. The court's view that heart disease is not an occupa-
tional disease is supported by decisions in several other states.5
At the time of the enactment of Section 97-53(26) of the General
Statutes, North Carolina joined Minnesota and California as the only
states with statutes listing heart disease as an occupational disease for
firemen.6 Florida joined this group in the spring of this year.7 Min-
nesota is the only other state which has had a case on the statute to
bosis, coronary occlusion, angina pectoris, or acute coronary insufficiency shall
each be deemed to be an occupational disease within the meaning of this article,
provided:
"(a) Such disease develops or first manifests itself during a period while such
member is an active member of such department or unit.
"(b) Said member, prior to such manifestation or development, shall have
served five consecutive years or more immediately preceding such manifestation or
development as an active member of said fire service and
"(c) Said member upon entering said fire service or not less than five years
prior to first manifestation or development of said heart disease, shall have under-
gone a medical examination, which examination failed to disclose the presence of
such disease.
"(d) Cities may adopt their own plans for the purpose of carrying out the in-
tent of this subsection.
"For the purpose of the foregoing, the time of development or first manifesta-
tion of such disease shall only be determined by and run from the date of first
notice of the existence of such diseases to such member by a physician or the date
of death as a result of such diseases.!2 N. C. CoNsT. ART. I, §7: "No man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or
separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of pub-
lic services."
Duncan v. City of Charlotte, 234 N. C. 86, 66 S. E. 2d 22 (1951).
'West v. N. C. Dept. of Conservation, 229 N. C. 232, 49 S. E. 2d 398 (1948).
'Lohndorf v. Pepper Bros. Paint Co., 135 N. J. L. 352, 52 A. 2d 61 (1947)(manager of paint store died of coronary occlusion while engaged in regular
work); Jones v. Remington Arms Co., 209 S. W. 2d 156 (Kan. 1948) (machine
operator in factory suffered heart attack while engaged in regular work) ; Cooper
v. Vintieri, 43 N. W. 2d 747 (S. D. 1950) (laborer died from heart disease while
doing usual work) ; Nickelberry v. Ritchie Grocery Co., 196 La. 1011, 200 So. 330
(1941) (while performing usual tasks laborer developed heart disease).
' CALIF. CODE ANiN. §3212 (1950) (statutes of California also cover policemen,
fire wardens, and state patrolmen) ; MASON'S MINN. ST. Sr'F. §4327(9) (1940).
" The Florida Legislature passed a bill providing coverage for fireman from
tuberculosis, hypertension, and heart disease at the last session on May 31, 1951.
See Vol. 8, BurEAu OF LABOR STANDARDS LEGiSLATnm REPORT, June 15, 1951.
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reach the highest court and its holding was contra to that of the North
Carolina court.8 Minnesota has a constitutional prohibition against
special legislation very similar to that of North Carolina, 9 but the Min-
nesota court did not find that the statute violated it."° That court held
that there was enough evidence to support the legislative designation of
heart disease as an occupational disease for firemen.' The North
Carolina Supreme Court, which seems to take a less liberal view of
workmen's compensation, thought that the medical testimony failed to
show that heart disease was so related to the work of firemen as to
classify it as an occupational disease for that group. 12
The 'difference between the decisions of the two courts seems to lie
in the liberality of construction of the special privilege clause of the
respective constitutions. The North Carolina Supreme Court would
require a very convincing basis for the creation of any class such as the
firemen in this case, while the Minnesota court goes along with the
legislature so long as it is not shown that the legislature acted purely
arbitrarily in establishing the class.' 3 In view of the vagueness of the
constitutional provisions, each decision as a matter of judicial interpre-
tation can be justified. However, the effect of the Minnesota decision
has been severely weakened by a recent amendment to the occupational
disease statute which abolished the presumption that any of the enu-
merated diseases are occupational diseases in any given case.' 4 Under
Minnesota law as it now stands the claimant must show that the heart
disease arose out of or in the course of the employment.1
In examining the testimony in both the Minnesota and North Caro-
S Kellerman v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 351, 356, 1 N. W. 2d S78, 380 (1941):
"The Statute is undoubtedly constitutional."
I MINN. CoNsT. ART. 4, §33: "The legislature shall pass no local or special law
... granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive
privilege, immunity or franchise whatever or authorizing public taxation for a
private purpose'
'0 "Legislation in its very nature involves classification and a statute will be
held unconstitutional on that ground only where the class it necessarily establishes
has no substantial basis in fact." Kellerman v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 351,
355, 1 N. W. 2d 378, 380 (1941).
"Id. at 355, 1 N. W. 2d at 380 "The apparent high percentage of occurrence
of conorary sclerosis among firemen demonstrates that the legislature was not
arbitrary in providing for them as a class."
2 "The record in the instant case reflects no evidence that the fatal heart attack
suffered by the deceased was in fact an occupational disease or that it was pro-
duced by his employment as a fireman." Duncan v. Charlotte, 234 N. C. 86, 92,
66 S. E. 2d 22, 26 (1951).
x See note 10 sup ra.
"Prior legislative enumeration of occupational disease shall not entitle any
employee afflicted with such disease to a presumption that the same is in fact an
occupational disease." MINN. STAT. ANN. §176.66 (1949) (statute enacted 1943).
1" Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555, 18 N. W. 2d 535 (1945). See Riesen-
feld Forty Years of Workmen's Compenwation, 35 MINN. L. REv. 525, 539 (1951) :
"Even the Supreme Court of Minnesota, usually in line with the progressive courts,
still looks for extraordinary exertion in case of heart failure."
[Vol. 30
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lina cases it becomes evident that the causes and aggravating factors of
heart disease are something about which little is known. The medical
experts were in conflict as to the causes' 6 and only one doctor in either
group would make any definite statement on the subject. 17 The chief
basis for classifying heart disease as an occupational disease for firemen
is statistical,' 8 and the statistics available are incomplete.
The underlying conflict involved in these cases might be explained
by differing views as to the basic theory of workmen's compensation.
If it is social insurance as contended by some,19 then the heart disease
statute should include all workers covered by the act. If it is insurance
against purely industrial accidents and occupational diseases as set forth
by the North Carolina court,20 then there must be a stronger basis for
singling out firemen for protection. It would seem that the North
Carolina Legislature has the clear power to enlarge the occupational
disease provisions, 21 but to arbitrarily single out a special group for
substantial benefits is not permitted by the constitution.
The enactment of Section 97-53(26) of the General Statutes seems
to have been too far ahead of medical science and such legislation must
await further medical knowledge unless the North Carolina basic con-
cept of an occupational 'disease is drastically altered.22
COLVIN T. LEONARD, JR.
1" Kellerman v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 351, 355, 1 N. W. 2d 375, 380
(1941): "The medical witnesses for the relator . . . testified in substance that
coronary sclerosis is not more prevalent among firemen than among other occupa-
tions and that Kellerman's work had no effect upon his coronary sclerosis." Two
other doctors testified that the work of a fireman would contribute to the injury.
Brief for appellant, p. 7, Duncan v. Charlotte, 234 N. C. 86, 66 S. E. 2d 22 (1951) :
Dr. Robert L. McMillan, an expert in heart ailments at Bowman Gray Medical
School appeared for claimant. Dr. McMillan testified that medical opinion is not
certain whether or not tension is a contributing factor in the development of the
coronary diseases. He further testified that he had no opinion as to whether or
not the deceased employee's death was brought about by his employment as a
fireman.
"'Kellerman v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 351, 355, 1 N. W. 2d 375, 380(1941). An article by Dr. Harry L. Smith of the Mayo Clinic stated that occu-
pation did have an effect on the incidence of coronary sclerosis. See also Boas,
Trauma and Heart Disease, 2 NAccA L. JOURNAL 113 (1948).
"' Kellerman v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 351, 354, 1 N. W. 2d 375, 380:
"The medical experts were in complete accord that the cause of coronary sclerosis
is unknown, and that the only practical way to determine whether it is due to the
nature of the employment, in view of the present status of medical knowledge on
the subject, would be to test its incidence in different occupational groups.'
10 See Riesenfeld, mspra note 15, at 525.
20 The rule bf causal relation is the very sheet anchor of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. It has kept the Act within the limits of its intended scope, that of
providing compensation benefits for industrial injuries, rather than branching out
into the field of general health insurance benefits. Vause v. Equipment Co., 233
N. C. 88, 92, 63 S. E. 2d 173, 176 (1950).
2 "The State Legislature is justified in extending the benefits of the compensa-
tion law as far as it may reasonably determine occupational hazard to -extend. ..
58 A!. JUR. 641.221 SCHNEIDER, WORKM I'S COiPENSAnIoN 644 (2d ed.): "A disease con-
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